Abstract. Asymmetric searchable encryption allows searches to be carried over ciphertexts, through delegation, and by means of trapdoors issued by the owner of the data. Public Key Encryption with Keyword Search (PEKS) is a primitive with such functionality that provides delegation of exact-match searches. As it is important that ciphertexts preserve data privacy, it is also important that trapdoors do not expose the user's search criteria. The difficulty of formalizing a security model for trapdoor privacy lies in the verification functionality, which gives the adversary the power of verifying if a trapdoor encodes a particular keyword. In this paper, we provide a broader view on what can be achieved regarding trapdoor privacy in asymmetric searchable encryption schemes, and bridge the gap between previous definitions, which give limited privacy guarantees in practice against search patterns. We propose the notion of Strong Search Pattern Privacy for PEKS and construct a scheme that achieves this security notion.
Introduction
As cloud services become increasingly popular, security concerns arise from exposing the users data to third-party service providers. Encryption can be used to protect the user's data privacy, but usability is sacrificed if not even the most basic operations, such as searching over the user's data, can be delegated to the service provider. In the public key setting, Boneh et al. [1] were the first to propose a primitive to tackle this problem. They called it Public Key Encryption with Keyword Search (PEKS), a primitive that provides delegation of exact-match searches over ciphertexts. A typical scenario where this primitive can bring great benefits to users (and consequently to service providers wishing to increase their customer base as well) is that of any email system. Suppose user Alice stores her emails in the servers of some email service provider, so that she can access them from either her laptop or her smartphone. Alice does not trust the service provider or fears that government agencies may require the service provider to hand over all her data. Using standard public key encryption, any user with Alice's public key can send her encrypted emails that only she can decrypt. For Alice to find a particular email later on, the sender could also attach to the email some searchable ciphertexts, produced from a PEKS scheme, with keywords that Alice might use when searching for this email. These ciphertexts are searchable upon delegation, meaning that only Alice can authorize the email service provider to search on her behalf by issuing a trapdoor that encodes Alice's search criteria (e.g. ciphertexts that encrypt the keyword "project xx123 -meeting"), generated from her own secret key. The service provider searches through all Alice's emails for those containing searchable ciphertexts that match the issued trapdoor, and returns to her only those with a positive match.
Many efforts have been put in asymmetric searchable encryption in general, as surveyed in [2] , most towards more efficient PEKS schemes (or relying on weaker assumptions) or towards primitives with more flexible search queries, such as conjunctive, disjunctive, subset and inner product types of queries. Until recently [3] [4] [5] , the concern was always to preserve data privacy in the ciphertexts and no attention was paid to possible information leakage from the trapdoors. In fact, some schemes, as the statistically consistent scheme proposed in [6] , include the keyword itself in the trapdoor. In this paper we focus on defining trapdoor privacy for PEKS and constructing a scheme that provably stands up to the definition. Nevertheless, the definition can easily be extended to asymmetric searchable encryption in general.
The difficulty of formalizing a security model for trapdoor privacy lies in the verification functionality of PEKS, which in the public key setting depends on the trapdoor itself and ciphertexts created from publicly known parameters. This provides to any adversary the power to verify if a trapdoor encodes a particular keyword. (The adversary encrypts the chosen keyword under the public key associated with the trapdoor; if the ciphertext matches the trapdoor then the trapdoor encodes the chosen keyword.) Therefore, an offline dictionary attack can always be launched, putting aside the possibility of formalizing the security notion of trapdoor privacy as a traditional choose-then-guess indistinguishability game. In many cases, the keywords encoded in trapdoors are sufficiently unpredictable for a dictionary attack to be infeasible. So, defining the right notion of trapdoor privacy is crucial to guarantee that the user's privacy is fully protected.
Related work
Abdalla et al. [6] proposed a general black-box transformation from anonymous Identity-Based Encryption (IBE) to PEKS, where the resulting PEKS scheme is secure in the traditional ciphertext indistinguishability sense. Identities and their secret keys in the original IBE scheme map to keywords and trapdoors in resulting PEKS scheme, respectively. The anonymity requirement informally states that ciphertexts leak no information regarding the identity of the recipient, leading to the commonly desired keyword-privacy guarantees over ciphertexts in PEKS. The standard notion of ciphertext indistinguishability in IBE leads to computational consistency in the resulting PEKS scheme, which informally means that it is hard for computationally bounded adversaries to find two distinct keywords such that the trapdoors for the first keyword positively match the ciphertexts of the second keyword. (Note that if keywords are hashed before used in the scheme, inconsistency happens at least every time H(w 1 ) = H(w 2 ), where w 1 = w 2 .) We refer the reader to Section 2 for precise details on this transformation and to [6] for formal proofs.
This black-box transformation allows us to define a "dual" security notion for IBE that will lead to the desired trapdoor privacy notion in PEKS, and motivates the construction of IBE schemes that can provably satisfy it. This approach was also followed by [3] [4] [5] , which, to the best of our knowledge, are the only works to address the concerns on trapdoor privacy in asymmetric searchable encryption.
Two distinct scenarios have to be considered to model trapdoor privacy. One in the presence of ciphertexts that positively match the trapdoors, and the other in the absence of such ciphertexts. Consider a toy example where the service provider possesses one ciphertext that belongs to Alice and two trapdoors that Alice issued for searches to be performed on her behalf. The service provider executes the test-search and one of the following cases occurs: From cases (a) and (b), we can see that, in the presence of ciphertexts that match the trapdoors, an equality relation between the keywords encoded under the trapdoors can be determined trivially. In such cases, the notion of trapdoor privacy focus on revealing as little information as possible on the keywords themselves 1 . Very recently, Boneh et al. [4] put forward two formal definitions of different strengths for IBE, inspired by the security definition given for deterministic encryption in [7] : Function Privacy and Enhanced Function Privacy. The latter leads to a security notion in PEKS (after the black-box transformation in [6] ), which addresses this scenario.
Case (c) covers the scenario where trapdoors do not match any ciphertext. It is in Alice's best interest to hide her search pattern from the service provider. If the search pattern is revealed, the attacker could concentrate its resources on breaking the privacy of trapdoors encoding the most frequent keywords, which a priori are the most relevant to Alice. This issue is particularly important for PEKS due to the possibility of launching dictionary attacks. Nishioka [3] proposed a model denoted Search Pattern Privacy, which partially addresses this scenario. However, the model limits the distinguishing game to two trapdoors, which provides insufficient privacy guarantees in practice, considering that an actual attacker may have access to a much larger number of (possibly related) trapdoors. As we show in Section 4, and contrarily to intuition, the so-called hybrid argument does not apply here, unless trapdoors can be efficiently re-randomized. Also, after the transformation from IBE to PEKS, Function Privacy leads to a security definition that provides limited privacy guarantees against search patterns, since the resulting model prevents the adversary from being challenged with trapdoors encoding the same keyword.
Our contributions
In this paper, we provide a broader view on what can be achieved regarding trapdoor privacy in asymmetric searchable encryption, and bridge the gap between currently existent definitions. In more detail, our contributions are the following:
-We formulate the "dual" notion of Search Pattern Privacy, which we call Weak Key Unlinkability for IBE. If an IBE scheme is provably secure in the Weak Key Unlinkability model, the resulting PEKS scheme from the black-box transformation in [6] has Search Pattern Privacy. We then show that Search Pattern Privacy, as defined in [3] , is insufficient in practice. We do so by constructing a new anonymous IBE scheme with Weak Key Unlinkability, based on the anonymous IBE scheme by Boyen and Waters [8] . Applying the black-box transformation to this scheme therefore results in a PEKS scheme with Search Pattern Privacy. However, we show that the resulting scheme fails to hide search patterns when more than two trapdoors have been issued. (Of independent interest, the new anonymous IBE scheme is more efficient than that in [8] , and eliminates the selective-ID constraint, but the security proofs rely on random oracles.) -We propose a new security model, strictly stronger than Weak Key Unlinkability, which we call Strong Key Unlinkability for IBE. The model allows the adversary to be challenged with multiple secret keys, which leads to a new notion that we refer to as Strong Search Pattern Privacy for PEKS, in which the adversary is allowed to be challenged with multiple trapdoors, instead of just two. -We compare the different notions of security and show that Key Unlinkability and Function Privacy are independent security notions. We provide counter-examples to show that Strong Key Unlinkability does not imply Function Privacy, neither does Enhanced Function Privacy implies Weak Key Unlinkability. -We introduce a new hardness assumption for composite order groups. We call this assumption the Composite Decisional Diffie-Hellman (CDDH) and show that it is weaker than the Composite 3-party Diffie-Hellman (C3DH) assumption made in [9] by Boneh and Waters. Assuming CDDH is intractable, we extend our new IBE scheme to groups of composite order, and prove that the scheme now satisfies Strong Key Unlinkability security.
Structure of the paper
In the following section we recall some background on bilinear groups of prime order and composite order, introduce the new CDDH assumption, and show that this assumption is weaker than the well-established C3DH assumption. We also define consistency and standard security notions for IBE and PEKS, and describe the black-box transformation from anonymous IBE to PEKS. In Section 3, we recall Nishioka's Search Pattern Privacy model for PEKS, and introduce the strictly stronger Strong Search Pattern Privacy model. We also formulate the "dual" proprieties for IBE, Weak Key Unlinkability and Strong Key Unlinkability, which lead to Search Pattern Privacy and 3
Strong Search Pattern Privacy for PEKS, respectively, after the black-box transformation from IBE to PEKS. In Section 4, we construct a new anonymous IBE scheme and prove it secure in the Weak Key Unlinkability model. We then present a concrete attack to show that the scheme does not satisfy the notion of Strong Key Unlinkability. Finally, we extend the newly introduced scheme to groups of composite order, and prove that the scheme is now secure in the Strong Key Unlinkability model. We end by some concluding remarks and point out possible directions for future work, in Section 5.
Preliminaries
Notation. We write a ← b to denote the algorithmic action of assigning the value of b to the variable a. We use ⊥ / ∈ {0, 1} to denote a special failure symbol. If S is a set, we write a ← $ S for sampling a from S uniformly at random. If A is a probabilistic algorithm we write a ← $ A(i 1 , i 2 , . . . , i n ) for the action of running A on inputs i 1 , i 2 , . . . , i n with random coins, and assigning the result to a. If a is a variable, |a| denotes the length in bits of its representation. We denote by a||b the concatenation of variables a and b, represented as bit-strings.
Games. In this paper we use the code-based game-playing language [10] . Each game has an Initialize and a Finalize procedure. It also has specifications of procedures to respond to an adversary's various queries. A game is run with an adversary A as follows. First Initialize runs and its outputs are passed to A. Then A runs and its oracle queries are answered by the procedures of the game. When A terminates, its output is passed to Finalize, which returns the outcome of the game. In each game, we restrict attention to legitimate adversaries, which is defined specifically for each game. We use lists as data structures to keep relevant state in the games. The empty list is represented by empty square brackets [ ]. We denote by list ← a : list the action of appending element a to the head of list. To access the value stored in index i of list and assign it to a, we write a ← list [i] .
To denote the number of elements in list, we use |list|. Unless stated otherwise, lists are initialized empty and variables are first assigned with ⊥.
Bilinear groups
We first revise pairings over prime-order groups and the associated Decision Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DBDH) and Decision Linear (DLIN) assumptions [11, 12] . We then revise pairings over compositeorder groups [13] , introduce the new Composite Decision Diffie-Hellman (CDDH) assumption, and show that this assumption is weaker than the well-established Composite 3-party Diffie-Hellman (C3DH) assumption made in [9] .
Bilinear groups of prime order Definition 1. A prime-order bilinear group generator is an algorithm G P that takes as input a security parameter λ and outputs a description Γ = (p, G, G T , e, g) where:
-G and G T are groups of order p with efficiently-computable group laws, where p is a λ-bit prime. -g is a generator of G.
-e is an efficiently-computable bilinear pairing e : G x G → G T , i.e., a map satisfying the following properties:
) be the description output by G P (λ). We say the DBDH assumption holds for description Γ if, for every PPT adversary A, the following definition of advantage is negligible in λ.
where game DBDH is described in Fig. 1 . procedure Initialize(λ):
) be the description output by G P (λ). We say the DLIN assumption holds for description Γ if, for every PPT adversary A, the following definition of advantage is negligible in λ.
where game DLIN is described in Fig. 2 .
Bilinear groups of composite order
Definition 4. A composite-order bilinear group generator is an algorithm G C that takes as input a security parameter λ and outputs a description Γ = (p, q, G, G T , e, g) where:
-G and G T are groups of order n = pq, where p and q are independent λ-bit primes, with efficiently computable group laws. -g is a generator of G.
Subgroups G p ⊂ G and G q ⊂ G of order p and order q can be generated respectively by g p = g q and g q = g p . We recall some important facts regarding these groups:
where n ← pq. We say the CDDH assumption holds for description Γ if, for every PPT adversary A, the following definition of advantage is negligible in λ.
where game C3DH is described in Fig. 3 .
) be the description output by G C (λ) and Γ = (n, G, G T , e, g), where n ← pq. We say the CDDH assumption holds for description Γ if, for every PPT adversary A, the following definition of advantage is negligible in λ.
where game CDDH is described in Fig. 4 .
procedure Finalize(bit ): if bit = bit return True else return False Fig. 3 . Game C3DH.
procedure Initialize(λ):
procedure Finalize(bit ): if bit = bit return True else return False Fig. 4 . Game CDDH.
In game C3DH, adversary is given a tuple (
is a CDDH tuple. Therefore, CDDH is a weaker assumption than C3DH.
Anonymous Identity-Based Encryption
Identity-Based Encryption (IBE) was first introduced by Boneh and Franklin [11] . For convenience, and following the same approach as in [8] , we provide real-or-random definitions for semantic security and anonymity, instead of the more usual (but asymptotically equivalent) left-or-right indistinguishability games 2 .
An IBE scheme Π = (Setup, Extract, Enc, Dec) is specified by four polynomial-time algorithms associated with a message space M and an identity space I.
-Setup(λ): On input the security parameter λ, this algorithm returns a master secret key Msk and public parameters params. -Extract(params, Msk, id): On input public parameters params, a master secret key Msk and an identity id ∈ I, this algorithm outputs a secret key sk. -Enc(params, m, id): On input public parameters params, a message m ∈ M and an identity id ∈ I, this algorithm outputs a ciphertext c. -Dec(params, c, sk): On input public parameters params, a ciphertext c and a secret key sk, this algorithm outputs either a message m or a failure symbol ⊥.
The correctness of an IBE scheme requires that decryption reverses encryption, i.e., for any λ ∈ N, any (Msk, params) ← $ Setup(λ), any id ∈ I, any m ∈ M, we have that Dec(params, Enc(params, m, id), Extract(params, Msk, id)) = m.
Definition 7. An IBE scheme Π is semantically secure if, for every legitimate PPT adversary A, the following definition of advantage is negligible in λ
where game IBE-IND-CPA is described in Fig. 5 . 
where game IBE-ANO is described in Fig. 6 .
procedure Initialize(λ): 
Public Key Encryption with Keyword Search
Public Key Encryption with Keyword Search (PEKS) [1] is a form of Asymmetric Searchable Encryption with exact-match searches. The standard notion of security for keyword privacy in ciphertexts is semantic security, which ensures that any partial information on the keyword cannot be feasibly determined from the ciphertext, unless a trapdoor for that keyword is available. The notion of computational consistency is taken from [6] . It guarantees that the primitive fulfills its function. We use the alternative (but asymptotically equivalent) real-or-random definitions.
A PEKS scheme E = (KeyGen, PEKS, Trapdoor, Test) is specified by four polynomial-time algorithms associated with a keyword space W.
-KeyGen(λ): On input the security parameter λ, this algorithm returns a private/public key pair (sk, pk). -PEKS(pk, w): On input a public key pk and a keyword w ∈ W, this algorithm produces a searchable ciphertext c. -Trapdoor(pk, sk, w): On input a public key pk, a secret key sk and a keyword w ∈ W, this algorithm outputs a trapdoor tp for w. -Test(pk, c, tp): On input a public key pk, a searchable ciphertext c and a trapdoor tp, this algorithm outputs either True or False.
Definition 9. A PEKS scheme E is computationally consistent if, for every legitimate PPT adversary A, the following definition of advantage is negligible in λ
where game PEKS-CONSIST is described in Fig. 7 .
Definition 10. A PEKS scheme E is semantically secure if, for every legitimate PPT adversary A, the following definition of advantage is negligible in λ
where game PEKS-IND-CPA is described in Fig. 8 .
procedure Finalize(w0, w1): c ← $ PEKS(pk, w0) tp ← $ Trapdoor(pk, sk, w1) return Test(pk, c, tp) ∧ (w0 = w1) Fig. 7 . Game PEKS-CONSIST.
From anonymous IBE to PEKS: a black-box transformation
A semantically secure and computationally consistent PEKS scheme E = (KeyGen, PEKS, Trapdoor, Test) can be constructed from an anonymous and semantically secure IBE scheme Π = (Setup, Extract, Enc, Dec), by applying the black-box transformation given by Abdalla et al. in [6] . For completeness, we describe the transformation bellow.
-KeyGen(λ): (Msk, params) ← $ Setup(λ); (sk, pk) ← (Msk, params); return (sk, pk).
-PEKS(pk, w): id ← w; m ← $ M;ĉ ← $ Enc(pk, m, id); c ← (m,ĉ); return c.
-Trapdoor(pk, sk, w): id ← w; sk id ← $ Extract(pk, sk, id); tp w ← sk id ; return tp w .
-Test(pk, c, tp w ): (m,ĉ) ← c; sk id ← tp w ;m ← Dec(pk,ĉ, sk id ); if m =m then return True else return False.
Note that the keyword space W of the derived PEKS scheme is the identity space I of the original IBE scheme.
Security Definitions
In this section, we recall Nishioka's Search Pattern Privacy model for PEKS [3] . We then strengthen the model to better reflect real attack scenarios, by allowing the adversary to be challenged with multiple trapdoors, instead of just two. We denote this model by Strong Search Pattern Privacy. We also formulate the "dual" proprieties for IBE, Weak Key Unlinkability and Strong Key Unlinkability, which lead to Search Pattern Privacy and Strong Search Pattern Privacy for PEKS, respectively, after the black-box transformation from IBE to PEKS described in Section 2.
Search Pattern Privacy for PEKS
In Search Pattern Privacy model from [3] , the adversary receives two trapdoors and is asked to determine whether the two trapdoors encode the same or different keywords, which are uniformly sampled from the keyword space to ensure that these are sufficiently unpredictable and avoid brute force attacks 3 .
Definition 11. A PEKS scheme E, associated with a non-polynomial size keyword space, has (Weak) Search Pattern Privacy if, for every legitimate PPT adversary A, the following definition of advantage is negligible in λ
where game WEAK-SSP is described in Fig. 9 . 
where game STRONG-SSP is described in Fig. 10 .
procedure Trapdoor(w): tp ← $ Trapdoor(pk, sk, w) return tp procedure Finalize(bit ): return (bit = bit ) Fig. 9 . Game WEAK-SSP [3] .
procedure Initialize(λ): Remark. Nishioka [3] also proposed the notion of IND-PKP security, where two trapdoors for either the same or different keywords, but generated under different secret keys, are given to the adversary as a challenge. This notion may be relevant in specific multi-user scenarios, however is out of the scope of our work.
Key Unlinkability for IBE
Similar to the requirements for keyword space in PEKS Search Pattern Privacy models, Key Unlinkability models for IBE require that the size of the identity space is at least ω(log λ), where λ is the security parameter of the scheme.
Definition 13. An IBE scheme Π, associated with a non-polynomial size identity space, has Weak Key Unlinkability if, for every legitimate PPT adversary A, the following definition of advantage is negligible in λ
where game WEAK-KEY-UNLINK is described in Fig. 11 . Definition 14. An IBE scheme Π, associated with a non-polynomial size identity space, has Strong Key Unlinkability if, for every legitimate PPT adversary A, the following definition of advantage is negligible in λ
where game STRONG-KEY-UNLINK is described in Fig. 12 .
procedure Initialize(λ): Weak Key Unlinkability and Strong Key Unlinkability lead to Search Pattern Privacy and Strong Search Pattern Privacy for PEKS, respectively, after the black-box transformation from IBE to PEKS described in Section 2. Proofs follow directly from the transformation and are omitted here. Lemma 1. An IBE scheme Π with Weak Key Unlinkability leads to a PEKS scheme E with (Weak) Search Pattern Privacy, after the black-box transformation from IBE to PEKS proposed in [6] .
Lemma 2. An IBE scheme Π with Strong Key Unlinkability leads to a PEKS scheme E with Strong Search Pattern Privacy, after the black-box transformation from IBE to PEKS proposed in [6] .
Function Privacy for IBE: an independent security notion
Very recently, Boneh, Raghunathan and Segev [4] put forward two security notions, of different strength, for IBE, inspired by the security definition given for deterministic encryption in [7] : Function Privacy and Enhanced Function Privacy. These notions ask that "decryption keys reveal essentially no information on their corresponding identities, beyond the absolute minimum necessary". In both definitions, the adversary is first given the public parameters and then interacts with a Real-or-Random function privacy oracle, which takes as input an adversarially-chosen joint probability distribution -represented as a circuit -for random variables X 1 , X 2 , ..., X L defined over the identity space I, and outputs L secret keys either for identities sampled from the given joint probability distribution or for independent and uniformly distributed identities over I. An adversary is legitimate if, for every i ∈ {1..L} and every x 1 , ..., x i ∈ I, it holds that:
. Put differently, the chosen joint probability distribution for (X 1 , ..., X L ) has to be such that every random variable X i is sufficiently unpredictable, even if every random variable X j<i has been fixed. To discard exhaustive searches, a conditional min-entropy H ∞ (X i | X1=x1,...,X i−1 ) of at least ω(log λ) bits is required 4 . The Enhanced model provides the adversary with an extra function-privacy encryption oracle capable of encrypting adversarially-chosen messages under the identities sampled by Real-or-Random oracle.
We first remark that Key Unlinkability and Function Privacy security models are essentially different in the way the challenger samples ids: in the former ids are sampled uniformly from the id space, whereas in the latter model ids may be sampled from an adversarial-chosen joint probability distribution, with (possibly) non-uniform random variables, but also high min-entropy requirements. In the following subsections we provide counterexamples to show that Function Privacy (both Non-enhanced and Enhanced) and Key Unlinkability (both Weak and Strong) are independent security notions. Meaningful counterexamples follow. For a quick overview, Figure 13 states the relations between Weak Key Unlinkability, Strong Key Unlinkability, Function Privacy and Enhanced Function Privacy security notions. We stress that even Enhanced Function Privacy fails to capture the security guarantees of Weak Key Unlinkability. In practice, transforming an anonymous IBE with Enhanced Function Privacy to PEKS (according to the transformation described in Section 2) results in no guarantee that the service provider will not be able to find search patterns in the users' trapdoors.
Enhanced Function Privacy =⇒ Weak Key Unlinkability. More generally, we can even show that an enhanced function-private IBE is not necessarily weak key-unlinkable. Consider F : {0, 1} λ x I → {0, 1} λ to be a secure PRF. We denote by f ← $ F the operation:
. Let Π = (Setup, Extract, Enc, Dec) be an enhanced function-private IBE. From Π we can construct Π , where Π is still enhanced function-private but definitely not weak key-unlinkable. We do so by simply modifying the extraction algorithm and appending to each secret key the result of a PRF on id. More precisely, Π = (Setup , Extract , Enc , Dec ) is constructed as follows: Informally, since f is unknown to the adversary, the adversary cannot choose distributions depending on f . Furthermore, F is a secure PRF, so no information on id can be acquired. Therefore, Π is still an enhanced function-private IBE. But, because f is deterministic, it is trivial to identify with overwhelming probability if two keys have been extracted from the same identity.
Strong Key Unlinkability =⇒ Function Privacy. Again, we show this by counterexample. Let Π = (Setup, Extract, Enc, Dec) be a strong key-unlinkable IBE associated with id space I = {0, 1} 2λ . We build Π = (Setup , Extract , Enc , Dec ) based on Π as follows:
-Dec (params, c, id, sk ) : (sk||b) ← sk ; m ← Dec(params, c, id, sk); return m.
In our counterexample scheme Π , we put a mark in keys for identities whose last λ bits are 0, by appending a 0 to the key (otherwise, 1 is appended). Since the subset containing these identities -let us call it U -is much smaller than the identity space I, identities uniformly sampled fromI are very unlikely to be in U, and thus to possess the mark. In fact, this only happens with probability Pr = 2 λ 2 2λ = 1 2 λ , which is a negligible function in the security parameter λ. Strong Key Unlinkability is therefore preserved in Π . However, U is big enough so that the unpredictability of an id uniformly sampled from U is high. By choosing to be challenged on a random variable X that selects any element in U with probability 1 2 λ and any element in {x ∈ I : x / ∈ U} with zero probability, an adversary could trivially win the function-privacy game, with overwhelming probability, just by looking into the key's mark. Also notice that the condition H ∞ (X) > ω(log λ) is satisfied. Generically, we can conclude that a strong key-unlinkable scheme is not necessarily function-private secure.
From Weak to Strong Key Unlinkability
A scheme with Weak Key Unlinkability. We construct a new anonymous IBE scheme with Weak Key Unlinkability, based on the anonymous IBE scheme of Boyen and Waters [8] . Our scheme relies on a bilinear group description Γ of prime order. To eliminate the selective-ID constraint, we adopt the random oracle approach introduced in the full paper of [14] , which replaces identities with their hash values. Furthermore, we simplify the resulted scheme by removing two group elements from the public parameters and from private keys, and obtain the final scheme in Fig. 14 . Compared with the original scheme, our scheme also saves two exponentiations in the key-extraction and encryption algorithms, and saves two pairing computations in the decryption algorithm. Our scheme preserves anonymity and semantic security proprieties, provided that the hash function H : I → G is modeled as a random oracle. Added to this, the scheme also has the Weak Key Unlinkability property.
Enc(params, m, id): Weak Key Unlinkability =⇒ Strong Key Unlinkability. Standard real-or-random definitions for public-key encryption model the encryption of a single plaintext. These definitions are equivalent (with some loss in tightness) to those allowing an adversary to acquire multiple encryptions, which can be shown by applying the hybrid argument from [15] . One might be tempted to think that the same hybrid argument also applies to Weak Key Unlinkability model. However, this argument does not apply, since we can show that an adversary can still easily distinguish patterns when more than two keys are issued with scheme Π [Fig. 14] .
Suppose that an adversary is asked to distinguished between tuples of the form (Extract(id 0 ), Extract(id 0 ), Extract(id 0 )), where the three secret keys are extracted from the same id, from those of the form (Extract(id 0 ), Extract(id 0 ), Extract(id 1 )), where the third key is extracted from an independent id, for uniformly sampled id 0 and id 1 ∈ I. Let (sk 0 , sk 1 , sk 2 ) be the tuple the adversary 12 receives, and for which it has to decide its form. We further expand sk i to (d i0 , d i1 , d i2 ) according to our scheme. If the keys were generated honestly, i.e. by following the algorithm Extract as described in Fig. 14 , the adversary simply has to check if
to determine the form of the tuple with overwhelming probability. If the result from the equality is true, then the three secret keys are very likely to have been extracted for the same id 5 . If the result is false, then the tuple is definitely of the form (Extract(id 0 ), Extract(id 0 ), Extract(id 1 )). For completeness, we show this by expanding and simplifying the above expression.
It is now clear that IBE scheme Π [ Fig. 14] fails to achieve the Strong Key Unlinkability property.
Conclusions and Future Directions
Our work shows that two distinct scenarios have to be considered to model trapdoor privacy: one in the presence of ciphertexts that match trapdoors, and the other in the absence of such ciphertexts. The notion of Strong Search Pattern Privacy we introduced here addresses privacy concerns up to the point there is ciphertexts matching the issued trapdoors, after which, search patterns can no longer be hidden from an attacker. Previous models provide limited privacy guarantees against search patterns.
The full version of [4] proposes a generic method for transforming any IBE scheme into an IBE scheme which achieves a weaker form of Enhanced Function Privacy, where the adversary is not allowed to chose distributions (from which identities are sampled for the challenge) that depend on the public parameters of the scheme. This relaxation results in a definition denoted Non-Adaptive Enhanced Function Privacy. In practice, for PEKS, it seems reasonable to assume that keywords will not depend on the public parameters of the scheme, and, in particular, on the values output by the random oracle. So, from any anonymous IBE, using the black-box transformation described in Section 2, it is easy to obtain a PEKS scheme with reasonable trapdoor privacy guarantees for the scenario where the adversary possesses ciphertexts that positively match the trapdoors. A nonadaptive version of non-enhanced Function Privacy could be defined as well. We remark that in the random oracle model, our notion of Strong Key Unlinkability implies the notion of Non-adaptive Function Privacy, if keywords are hashed before used in the scheme.
In our Strong Search Pattern Privacy model, keywords are uniformly sampled from the keyword space. Instead, we could have adopted the strategy of [4] and allowed the adversary to specify a joint probability distribution from which identities are sampled, forcing only min-entropy requirements on each random variable individually. It becomes clear that there are two ways to strengthen the Function Privacy model in [4] : either by providing to the adversary a function-privacy encryption oracle as in model Enhanced Function Privacy [4] , or by relaxing the unpredictability requirements on the joint probability distribution from conditional min-entropy to min-entropy, on each random variable. The minimal requirement is that H ∞ (X i ) ≥ ω(log λ), for each random variable X i in the adversarial-chosen joint probability distribution. It remains an open problem to prove if our scheme Π [ Fig. 15 ] (or any other) can achieve security according to this generalized definition of Strong Key Unlinkability.
Challenge is well formed, as well as secret keys for random exponents r = r−z2
x , where x here is the value used to compute the hash of the corresponding id and r is sampled from Z p . For completeness, we present the equalities between the original expressions and those computed by the simulator 6 .
In Game 1 , the challenge ciphertext does not depend on m bit . Therefore, we conclude that Adv 
B Proof of Theorem 2
By applying the reduction of Theorem 1, we start with Game 1 , which setsĉ ← $ G T . In Game 2 , instead of computing its value, we set c 1 ← $ G. For A to successfully distinguish between Game 1 and Game 2 , the DLIN assumption would have to be tractable. Formally, we show this by constructing a simulator S 1 [ Fig. 17 ] that interpolates between Game 1 and Game 2 by playing game DLIN Γ,S1 [ Fig. 2 ]. As in Theorem 1, the hash function H is modelled as a random oracle. Without loss of generality, we assume that A places exactlyueries and always asks for the hash value of id before querying id to Extract and Real-or-Random. Employing the same strategy as before, simulator S 1 randomly tries to guess which query i ∈ {0, q−1} contains the id on which A asks to be challenged. When i is sucessfully guessed, which happens with probability 1 q , S 1 perfectly simulates Game 1 if Z is of the form g z3+z4 , and perfectly simulates Game 2 otherwise. This implies that t 1 = z 1 and t 2 = z 2 . Random function H is set to (g z2 ) x for every id but the id chosen for the challenge, which is set to g x , where x is a random value sampled from Z p . Challenge is well formed, as well as secret keys for random exponents r = r z2 , where r is sampled from Z p . Finally, notice that s = z 3 + z 4 and s 1 = z 4 , and that t 1 , t 2 , r , s and s 1 are uniformly distributed over Z p , as they should be. For completeness, we present the equalities between the original expressions and those computed by the simulator 7 .
In Game 2 , the challenge ciphertext does not depend on the receiver's identity. Therefore, we have that Adv
, which concludes our proof.
procedure Initialize(λ): Fig. 17 . Simulator S1 interpolates between Game1 and Game2 by playing game DLINΓ,S 1 .
C Proof of Theorem 3
Let A be any legitimate PPT adversary in game WEAK-KEY-UNLINK Π,A [ Fig. 11 ]. By building a simulator S 2 [ Fig. 18 ] that plays game DLIN Γ,S2 [ Fig. 2 ] and simulates game WEAK-KEY-UNLINK Π,A in such a way that A's guess can be forward to game DLIN Γ,S2 , we upper-bound the adversary's advantage to the hardness of deciding on an instance of this problem. The master secret key is set as following: t 1 = z 1 , t 2 = z 1 · a for random a ∈ Z p , and w = z3·b z1 for random b ∈ Z p . Although the values of t 1 , t 2 and w are unknown to S 2 , the corresponding public parameters can still be consistently computed: Ω = e(g, g) t1t2w = e(g, g) z1z1a z 3 ·b z 1 = e(Z 13 , g)
The hash function H is modelled as a random oracle and set to (g z1 ) x ·g − 1 y , for random x, y ∈ Z 2 p . We assume, without loss of generality, that A always asks for the hash value of id before querying id to oracle Extract. Whenever asked to extract a private key on some id, we set r = w · y, where y is the value used to compute the hash of that particular id. Note that this still makes r uniformily 
D Proof of Theorem 4
First, let us show an important re-randomization propriety that scheme Π possess and that is relevant for the completion of this proof. can be generated as follows, with a random y ∈ Z n and random R 0 , R 1 , R 2 ∈ G q : Let A be any PPT adversary against STRONG-KEY-UNLINK Π ,A [ Fig. 12 ]. We now drastically simplify the security model, so that it looks like the one presented in Fig. 19 , which we call 5-KEY-UNLINK. Using a hybrid argument and taking advantage of the re-randomization property previously described, we show that the advantage of A against STRONG-KEY-UNLINK Π ,A is polynomially-bounded by the advantage of A against 5-KEY-UNLINK.
